- Scientific papers that demonstrate the uselessness of lockdowns and mask-wearing in protecting people against COVID ‘infection’ offer further indirect evidence that flu-like illnesses are NOT person-to-person transmissible.
- Classification of HCIDs
- List of high consequence infectious diseases.
Bombshell! Public Health England Admits It Cannot Scientifically Prove That COVID-19 Is Contagious
At the start of this ‘pandemic’ I read about four separate experiments/ investigations carried out by the US Military during the Spanish Flu, all of which demonstrated that the Spanish Flu could not be passed from very sick to healthy persons, even by getting the healthy to drink the warm sputum of the sick.
HAFMarch 18, 2021
I wondered why no similar investigation was being conducted into the transmission of COVID19. Such experiments would not have to be so ‘gross’.
Furthermore. It’s not like this is an issue of no importance.
I sent FOI requests to the Department of Health and Social Care who, in a first reply (to the question of isolation of the virus), admitted that they held “no information relating to the isolation of Sars-Cov-2”, a pretty astonishing statement the elevates Sars-Cov-2 to the same mythical status as that of the unicorn, an extraordinary thing that no one has ever seen.
The main difference between a unicorn and Sars-Cov-2 is that no one has yet invented a “scientific” test of supposed constituent parts that “proves” the existence of a unicorn, which is a great shame as it would be quite something to observe how many people would be convinced if a ‘unicorn test’ ever returned a ‘positive’.
The DHSC also held no information about transmissibility/ contagion but suggested I sent my request to Public Health England.
PHE has replied (at last).
1. Here are the relevant lines:
Please could you forward any information you have relating to experimental evidence demonstrating that COVID-19 is person-to-person transmissible. PHE can confirm it does not hold information in the way specified by your request.
What this means is that no specific investigation has been carried out into the most central assumption (and that’s all it is) that has driven the global “response” to this supposed pandemic!
It would quite obviously be a straightforward issue to prove or disprove contagion (i.e. contagion-via-transmitted-droplet) experimentally. There is NO EXCUSE for not investigating this directly. Science could easily resolve contradicting beliefs about this, one way or the other.
In my opinion, it already has done. That’s why the failure to investigate is, in itself, evidence of bad faith and the enforcement of a diabolical lie.
Scientific papers that demonstrate the uselessness of lockdowns and mask-wearing in protecting people against COVID ‘infection’ offer further indirect evidence that flu-like illnesses are NOT person-to-person transmissible. This is simply not how such illnesses work. Other factors, external and internal, define who becomes ill and when.
2. Here was my second FOI request:
If no such experimental evidence exists for COVID-19 please could you forward any available evidence collected, targeting this particular issue over the past 150 years, that demonstrates person-to-person transmissibility for any other influenza type illness?”
Reply:
PHE can confirm it does hold this information. However, the information is exempt under section 21 of the FOI Act because it is reasonably accessible by other means, and the terms of the exemption mean that we do not have to consider whether or not it would be in the public interest for you to have the information. However, for your convenience we have included a link to the report ‘Impact of mass gatherings on Influenza.’
The first part of the response indicates, in my opinion, that PHE are admitting that they hold or are aware of the scientific evidence collected during the Spanish Flu (that used to be online in ‘The US Surgeon General’s Report 1919 [which disappeared from the document last October]).
By referring to not having to consider “whether or not it is in the public interest” that they release this information they are covertly admitting that they know the investigation demonstrated non-contagion and that it might be “in the public interest” that we be told this.
In fact, under our new global ‘Communitarian’ system (yes, we’re already in it folks) what is defined as “the public interest” is decided by rulers …. as anyone with a brain should realise by now.
Truth, or even what we understand as the public interest (i.e. the common good) has nothing to do with anything any more … as American voters recently found out the hard way.
The linked report, in my opinion, has little to do with my FOI request. The weak ‘conclusion’ of “The impact of mass gatherings on Influenza” suggests correlation without demonstrating proof of anything at all. The probabilities suggested in the Conclusion are, yet again, based on assumptions that the author does not even care to define.
Correlation between future infection and mass gatherings without investigation of other factors inherent to mass gatherings (e.g. everyone being in approximately the same place and therefore subject to multiple identical environmental influences at the same time) surely means nothing scientifically. The report admits there is no proof of causation but suggests it is “prudent” to discourage them.
Why, one wonders, does it not suggest it would be prudent to investigate the scientific community’s own primary assumption, that these illnesses are in any way contagious at all?
See this link to the full document.
Here is its ‘conclusion’.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion there is limited data indicating that mass gatherings are associated with influenza transmission and this theme is continued with the inclusion of new evidence for the update.
Certain unique events such as the Hajj, specialised settings including civilian and military ships- a new theme for this update, indoor venues and crowded outdoor venues provide the primary evidence base to suggest mass gatherings can be associated with Influenza outbreaks.
Some evidence suggests that restricting mass gatherings together with other social distancing measures may help to reduce transmission. However, the evidence is still not strong enough to warrant advocating legislated restrictions.
Therefore, in a pandemic situation a cautious policy of voluntary avoidance of mass gatherings would is still the most prudent message. Operational considerations including practical implications of policy directed at restricting mass gathering events should be carefully considered.
After reading the entirety of the FOI response, here is my own conclusion:
PHE admits that government’s assumption of human-to-human transmissibility of COVID-19 is based on … NO SCIENCE AT ALL!
NONE!
ZERO!
ZILCH!
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Source and reference: KevBoyle.blogspot.com; Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk [pdf]
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High consequence infectious diseases (HCID)
Guidance and information about high consequence infectious diseases and their management in England.
Status of COVID-19
As of 19 March 2020, COVID-19 is no longer considered to be a high consequence infectious disease (HCID) in the UK.
The 4 nations public health HCID group made an interim recommendation in January 2020 to classify COVID-19 as an HCID. This was based on consideration of the UK HCID criteria about the virus and the disease with information available during the early stages of the outbreak. Now that more is known about COVID-19, the public health bodies in the UK have reviewed the most up to date information about COVID-19 against the UK HCID criteria. They have determined that several features have now changed; in particular, more information is available about mortality rates (low overall), and there is now greater clinical awareness and a specific and sensitive laboratory test, the availability of which continues to increase.
The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) is also of the opinion that COVID-19 should no longer be classified as an HCID.
The need to have a national, coordinated response remains, but this is being met by the government’s COVID-19 response.
Cases of COVID-19 are no longer managed by HCID treatment centres only. All healthcare workers managing possible and confirmed cases should follow the updated national infection and prevention (IPC) guidance for COVID-19, which supersedes all previous IPC guidance for COVID-19. This guidance includes instructions about different personal protective equipment (PPE) ensembles that are appropriate for different clinical scenarios.
Definition of HCID
In the UK, a high consequence infectious disease (HCID) is defined according to the following criteria:
- acute infectious disease
- typically has a high case-fatality rate
- may not have effective prophylaxis or treatment
- often difficult to recognise and detect rapidly
- ability to spread in the community and within healthcare settings
- requires an enhanced individual, population and system response to ensure it is managed effectively, efficiently and safely
Classification of HCIDs
HCIDs are further divided into contact and airborne groups:
contact HCIDs are usually spread by direct contact with an infected patient or infected fluids, tissues and other materials, or by indirect contact with contaminated materials and fomites
airborne HCIDs are spread by respiratory droplets or aerosol transmission, in addition to contact routes of transmission
List of high consequence infectious diseases
A list of HCIDs has been agreed by a joint Public Health England (PHE) and NHS England HCID Programme:
| Contact HCID | Airborne HCID |
|---|---|
| Argentine haemorrhagic fever (Junin virus) | Andes virus infection (hantavirus) |
| Bolivian haemorrhagic fever (Machupo virus) | Avian influenza A H7N9 and H5N1 |
| Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) | Avian influenza A H5N6 and H7N7 |
| Ebola virus disease (EVD) | Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) |
| Lassa fever | Monkeypox |
| Lujo virus disease | Nipah virus infection |
| Marburg virus disease (MVD) | Pneumonic plague (Yersinia pestis) |
| Severe fever with thrombocytopaenia syndrome (SFTS) | Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)* |
*No cases reported since 2004, but SARS remains a notifiable disease under the International Health Regulations (2005), hence its inclusion here
**Human to human transmission has not been described to date for avian influenza A(H5N6). Human to human transmission has been described for avian influenza A(H5N1), although this was not apparent until more than 30 human cases had been reported. Both A(H5N6) and A(H5N1) often cause severe illness and fatalities. Therefore, A(H5N6) has been included in the airborne HCID list despite not meeting all of the HCID criteria.
The list of HCIDs will be kept under review and updated by PHE if new HCIDs emerge that are of relevance to the UK.
HCIDs in the UK
HCIDs, including viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs), are rare in the UK. When cases do occur, they tend to be sporadic and are typically associated with recent travel to an area where the infection is known to be endemic or where an outbreak is occurring. None of the HCIDs listed above are endemic in the UK, and the known animal reservoirs are not found in the UK.
As of February 2020, 2019, the UK has experience of managing confirmed cases of Lassa fever, EVD, CCHF, MERS and monkeypox. The vast majority of these patients acquired their infections overseas, but rare incidents of secondary transmission of MERS and monkeypox have occurred in the UK.
HCID risks by country
For health professionals wishing to determine the HCID risk in any particular country, an A to Z list of countries and their respective HCID risk is available.
Monthly summaries of global HCID events
PHE’s epidemic intelligence activities monitor global HCID events. These are published in a monthly summary.
Infection prevention and control in healthcare settings
Specific infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are required for suspected and confirmed HCID cases, in all healthcare settings (specialist and non-specialist).
IPC guidance appropriate for suspected and confirmed cases of Lassa fever, EVD, CCHF, MVD, Lujo virus disease, Argentinian haemorrhagic fever, Bolivian haemorrhagic fever and SFTS, is available in the ACDP guidance.
IPC guidance for MERS, avian influenza, Nipah virus infection, monkeypox and pneumonic plague, can be found in the relevant PHE guidance listed below.
Links to relevant PHE guidance for healthcare professionals
Specialist advice for healthcare professionals
The Imported Fever Service (IFS) provides 24-hour, 7-days a week telephone access to expert clinical and microbiological advice. Hospital doctors across the UK can contact the IFS after discussion with the local microbiology, virology or infectious disease consultant.
Hospital management of confirmed HCID cases
Once an HCID has been confirmed by appropriate laboratory testing, cases in England should be transferred rapidly to a designated HCID Treatment Centre. Occasionally, highly probable cases may be moved to an HCID Treatment Centre before laboratory results are available.
Contact HCIDs
There are 2 principal Contact HCID Treatment Centres in England:
the Royal Free London High Level Isolation Unit (HLIU)
the Newcastle Royal Victoria Infirmary HLIU.
Further support for managing confirmed contact HCID cases is provided by the Royal Liverpool Hospital and the Royal Hallamshire Hospital, Sheffield.
Airborne HCIDs
There are 5 interim Airborne HCID Treatment Centres in England. Adult and paediatric services are provided by 7 NHS Trusts:
- Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (adult and paediatric services)
- Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust, with a paediatric service provided by Imperial College Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
- Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust, with a paediatric service provided by Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust
- Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (adult and paediatric services)
- Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (adult service only)
Case transfer arrangements
Hospital clinicians seeking to transfer confirmed HCID cases, or discuss the transfer of highly probable HCID cases, should contact the NHS England EPRR Duty Officer. It is expected that each case will have been discussed with the Imported Fever Service before discussing transfer.
Travel health advice for HCIDs
The National Travel Health Network and Centre (NaTHNaC) provides travel health information about a number of HCIDs, for healthcare professionals and travellers. Advice can be accessed via the Travel Health Pro website.
Last updated 17 June 2020 + show all updates
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/high-consequence-infectious-diseases-hcid
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